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Abstract. Fienberg convincingly demonstrates that Bayesian models
and methods represent a powerful approach to squeezing illumination
from data in public policy settings. However, no school of inference is
without its weaknesses, and, in the face of the ambiguities, uncertain-
ties, and poorly posed questions of the real world, perhaps we should
not expect to find a formally correct inferential strategy which can be
universally applied, whatever the nature of the question: we should not
expect to be able to identify a “norm” approach. An analogy is made
between George Box’s “no models are right, but some are useful,” and
inferential systems.
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Professor Fienberg has compiled an impressive col-
lection of examples illustrating the power of the
Bayesian approach in public policy and government
applications. However, while these are compelling il-
lustrations of this power, I am uneasy about using
them as the basis for an assertion that this single
approach should be adopted as the “norm” (which
I take to mean “should be adopted as the standard
practice”). Does it not mean, instead, that Bayesian
approaches are valuable tools to be included in the
armory of every statistician working in public policy
and government settings, so that the statistician is
better able to pick an approach, method, or class
of methods which will shed most light on the prob-
lem he or she is tackling? That is, rather than ar-
guing for a “norm” method of inference, should we
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not accept that it is unrealistic to hope to find such
a single norm, and instead accept that different ap-
proaches are suited to different situations and ques-
tions? To follow the comment in Bayarri and Berger
(2004), should we not recognize that “statisticians
should readily use both Bayesian and frequentist
ideas” and “that each approach has a great deal
to contribute to statistical practice”? In fact, going
even further than this, perhaps it is brave to assert
that a unique formal system, with clear and pre-
cise definitions and methods, is adequate to provide
an inferential mapping from the real world, with
all its uncertainties, ambiguities, inadequate defini-
tions, and poorly posed problems. Fienberg himself
has elsewhere remarked that “the bottom line for
me involves drawing upon a mix of pragmatism and
principle” (Fienberg, 2006). We recognize that our
statistical models are only models, and that none
are “right” (as George Box told us), so why should
we believe that any particular inferential strategy is
“right,” in the sense that it should be adopted as
the norm?
This point is perhaps reinforced by Fienberg’s in-
troductory critique of the Bayesian perspective, in
which he notes that the most common criticism “is
that, since there is no single correct prior distribu-
tion, g(θ), all conclusions drawn from the posterior
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distribution are suspect.” He says that responses
to this criticism include the recommendation that
one should “consider and report the results associ-
ated with a variety of prior distributions” and “that
one should choose as a prior distribution one that
in some sense eliminates personal subjectivity.” He
does not argue that these remove the difficulty, but
he does go on to say that “one characteristic of the
Bayesian argument that weakens this criticism. . . is
that the more data we collect, the less influence the
prior distribution has on the posterior relative to
that of the data.” This justification seems to be
equivalent to saying that, while there may be a fun-
damental theoretical difficulty with Bayesian infer-
ence, this may not matter in practice. That would
mean that while it was fine as a practical inferen-
tial tool, it also could not be regarded as a formally
“correct” approach to inference—it would be (and
indeed is) just an approximation to the complexi-
ties of building an adequate model for inference in
the real world. After all, contrary to what is occa-
sionally glibly asserted, Bayesian methods do not
provide a solution to the problem of inductive infer-
ence: a Bayesian analysis does not answer the ques-
tion “what should I believe?” All Bayesian meth-
ods do is provide a rational (coherent, consistent)
way to update beliefs, to change one’s beliefs in the
light of evidence. This is implicit in Fienberg’s com-
ment that “Bayesian methodology. . . provides an in-
ternally consistent and coherent normative method-
ology.” But the internal consistency says nothing
about inference beyond the formal system involved;
to do this we do need to include the prior.
In contrast to the consistency and coherence of
Bayesian methodology, Fienberg says “frequentist
methodology has no such consistent normative fra-
mework.” Perhaps, but on the other hand, as Cox
[(2006), page 197] succinctly puts it: “Frequentist
analyses are based on a simple and powerful uni-
fying principle. The implications of data are exam-
ined using measuring techniques such as confidence
limits and significance tests calibrated, as are other
measuring instruments, indirectly by the hypothet-
ical consequences of their repeated use. In particu-
lar, they use the notion that consistency in a certain
respect of the data with a specified value of the pa-
rameter of interest can be assessed via a p-value.”
That is, we draw conclusions using a system which,
provided it is used properly, and subject to any as-
sumptions it makes, will be right most of the time—
and “being right most of the time” is surely a good
justification for using this approach.
Fienberg’s Section 2, in which the criticisms of
Bayesian methods quoted above are given, is en-
titled “The arguments for and against the use of
Bayesian methods.” He manages to resist rehearsing
the many criticisms of frequentist approaches, pos-
sibly because they would have made a paper in their
own right, but presumably they might also have
been marshalled as arguments for Bayesian meth-
ods (on the principle that “my enemy’s enemy is
my friend”). But he could have listed many other
criticisms of the Bayesian school, such as the Dutch
book problem, the problem of learning over time (co-
herence arguments refer to a static situation), the
interpretation of a probability 1/2 as meaning the
same thing whether based on a million coin tosses
or subjective opinion, multiparameter issues, as well
as others. These and other matters have been long
fought over, and while many will doubtless have
been resolved to the satisfaction of at least some
people, their mere presence suggests that there are
more questions about the Bayesian strategy than is
sometimes recognized. That is, it suggests that this
is merely an approach to approximating the com-
plexity of inference for the natural world.
Fienberg draws attention to the incorrect notion
that frequentist methods are “objective,” and also
notes that pragmatic Bayesian methods “have many
subjective elements.” Inference is an attempt to draw
some conclusion about the real world, and I agree
that it would be naive to suppose that that can be
done without subjective aspects. Since statistical in-
ference has the prerequisite of a mapping from the
world to the formal system within which the infer-
ence is to be conducted, it is difficult to see how that
could be done without some subjective element or
arbitrary choices. I would argue that the most im-
portant aspects of any statistical analysis are decid-
ing what the scientific question is, and then making
an effective (or at least adequate) mapping to a sta-
tistical question (e.g., Hand, 1994, 1996). Moreover,
since such mappings always lead to formal repre-
sentations which are, at best, only approximations
to the (perhaps even typically rather ill-posed) sci-
entific question, too much emphasis on the niceties
of the formal statistical inferential method may be
unnecessary. In my view, far too little attention is
devoted, in both statistical education and practice,
to the key issue of establishing the mapping—before
the formal inferential tools can be applied.
Perhaps the most impressive thing about Fien-
berg’s choice of examples is their scope, both in
terms of application areas and in terms of the way
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in which Bayesian methodology is applied. I will
make a few comments on the examples below, but it
would be naive to expect me to be able to fault the
analyses, on two counts. First, the examples were
presumably chosen as exemplars of the effectiveness
of such methodology in such applications, and this
is obviously best done by choosing examples where
the methodology is indeed effective. And second,
the sensitive and sophisticated use of any statisti-
cal school (in this case a particular one) by some-
one who really knows what he or she is doing is
likely to lead to effective results. By “know what he
or she is doing,” I mean balancing pragmatism and
principles, as noted above. This includes the ability
to choose a model form which captures the essence
of the problem, rather than either simply trying to
model every aspect of the underlying system or fail-
ing to include some vital aspect. The first of these
failures would risk rejecting a model which could
be perfectly adequate for the purpose at hand, even
though it failed to match the data in other ways, and
the second would mean the model was not fit for the
purpose. This is all part of the art of statistics.
I think, therefore, that the impressiveness of the
examples does not establish that this approach
should be adopted as the “norm,” but rather that
such an approach is highly effective (for these kinds
of problems), when used by someone who knows
what he or she is doing.
Several of the examples (small area estimation
and census adjustment, election night forecasting,
post-marketing surveillance of drugs) hinge on the
notion of “borrowing strength.” This is a power-
ful tool, built on so-called empirical Bayes, which
really represents something of a Bayesian frequen-
tist synthesis. I am sure we will see such methods
used more and more often as electronic data cap-
ture facilitates the easy compilation of massive data
sets, permitting exploration of finer and finer par-
titions. Continuing debates about national censuses
(e.g., Canada’s abandonment of the long-form cen-
sus) mean that such sophisticated tools are likely
to have an important public policy role in the fu-
ture. Likewise, the growing use of league tables and
other systems for ranking and rating hospitals (even
individual surgeons), schools, local authorities, po-
lice forces, and other public bodies are areas where
such adjustments can be very valuable. At a more
refined level, the problem of detecting adverse drug
reactions in post-marketing surveillance of drugs is
an example of a type of problem which produces
a very large number of cells arranged in a cross-
classification—and, naturally, often relatively small
cell counts. Overcoming this by borrowing strength
requires some way of determining the “similarity”
between cells. This might be done in various ways—
assuming independence between the factors of the
cross-classification, using external information char-
acterizing the objects, or based on measures of sim-
ilarities between the row and column count profiles
(e.g., Zhang, 2007).
Other examples, however, cover quite different
kinds of application of Bayesian methods—and so
reveal the strengths of Bayesian approaches in quite
different ways. One such area which is relatively
new is that of adaptive clinical trials. If borrow-
ing strength has a natural Bayesian interpretation,
so too does adaptive allocation of patients, as one’s
state of knowledge changes.
Statistics might be defined as the science of un-
certainty, so Fienberg’s example of climate change is
very fitting—and perhaps this is an example which
does very naturally fall into a Bayesian mold. The
UK’s Royal Society has recently produced a sum-
mary of the current scientific evidence on climate
change and its drivers, which spells out “where the
science is well established, where there is wide con-
sensus but continuing debate, and where there re-
mains substantial uncertainty” (Royal Society,
2010).
One of the recognized strengths of Bayesian meth-
ods is that they can extract information from small
samples (albeit at the cost of using “information”
from other sources), but that does not mean they are
restricted to small samples; indeed the potential to
produce cross-classifications of large samples, noted
above, means that the demand for Bayesian tools
can be just as great with large samples. Fienberg
does not explicitly use the phrase “data mining”
(though it appears twice in his references). How-
ever, his final paragraph draws attention to the use
of latent variable models with very large data sets.
More generally, data mining has made extensive use
of hidden Markov models, and has adopted various
other Bayesian modeling approaches, such as the use
of graphical models (“Bayesian belief networks”) in
health surveillance. Having said that, I think it is
true that most work which is explicitly labeled as
data mining still has a tendency to be focused on
algorithms rather than inference. The large sample
inferential work seems to be being carried out by
statisticians (e.g., Efron, 2010).
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In summary, I think Fienberg goes too far in sug-
gesting that Bayesian methods should become the
“norm” in public settings. Rather, I think we should
accept that no inferential system will always be ap-
propriate, therefore being adopted as a norm or stan-
dard approach. Instead we should acknowledge that
different systems are different strategies for tackling
a problem which defies a “correct” solution; that
we should therefore retain our flexibility, and match
our system to our objective, just as different mod-
els are suited to answering different questions. How-
ever, the examples Fienberg has chosen certainly il-
lustrate the power of the Bayesian perspective in
public policy applications. The examples also illus-
trate how advances in statistics are driven by prac-
tical applications, and the historical backgrounds to
the examples also show rather beautifully how sta-
tistical ideas develop over time. I thoroughly enjoyed
the paper.
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